

Ethiopia

(Presidential Country Files for Africa)





18

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 014194

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

CREATOR'S NAME . . . . . Richard T. Kennedy

RECEIVER'S NAME . . . . . Secretary Kissinger

DESCRIPTION . . . . . re Intelligence

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/16/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 2 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032300031

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR AFRICA

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Ethiopia

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 10/24/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . HJR



12

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 014195

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Ethiopia

CREATION DATE . . . . . 10/15/1974

VOLUME . . . . . 9 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032300031

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR AFRICA

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Ethiopia

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 10/24/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . HJR



1d

NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		G NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR			
10	16	11	12	12	7404855		

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES \_\_\_\_\_ FROM: Kennedy Kissinger, H S/S \_\_\_\_\_  
KISSINGER F COLBY, W \_\_\_\_\_ OTHER \_\_\_\_\_  
SCOWCROFT \_\_\_\_\_ SCHLESINGER, J \_\_\_\_\_  
DAVIS \_\_\_\_\_ ST EX SEC \_\_\_\_\_

REFERENCE: \_\_\_\_\_

CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
UNCLAS ☒ LOG IN/OUT  
LOU ☒ NO FORN NODIS  
C ☒ EYES ONLY EXDIS  
S ☒ CODEWORD  
TS ☒ SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: Intelligence Assessment of Ethiopia

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK _____
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES _____
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR _____
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION _____
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO _____ TO _____
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS _____
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO _____
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO _____ FOR _____
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY? _____
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE _____
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: _____
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS) <u>Returned to NSC/S by WH</u> <u>w/indication HAK had seen</u>
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
10/16	HAK	CIX		Info (10-26)	
11/12				HAK has seen	
11/12			C	Orig returned to NSC/S	

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH \_\_\_\_\_

CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS: \_\_\_\_\_

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ & DATE \_\_\_\_\_ BY \_\_\_\_\_

SPECIAL DISPOSITION: \_\_\_\_\_

CROSS REF W/ \_\_\_\_\_

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: \_\_\_\_\_ FOLDER: \_\_\_\_\_

MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:  
NOV 14 1974  
BY \_\_\_\_\_

CRT ID: \_\_\_\_\_ SA SF  
OPEN \_\_\_\_\_ HP NS  
CLOSE \_\_\_\_\_ WH EP  
PA DY





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 7423332

5815

November 27, 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Actions Taken with Regard to Economic and  
Military Assistance to Ethiopia

In view of the executions which took place in Addis Ababa last Saturday and our Embassy's recommendation as expressed in the attached cable, the Department of State has made the following decisions:

a) Until further notice or in the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, no additional military equipment will be shipped to Ethiopia, no additional U.S. military personnel will be assigned there, and no new military agreements will be concluded.

b) Until further notice or in the absence of specific instructions to the contrary, no new agreements will be concluded with Ethiopia in the fields of economic aid or drought relief, recovery and rehabilitation.

The foregoing has been coordinated with DOD/ISA, and with AID. ~~The above decisions will be made public in response to any inquiries.~~

*for* George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

Addis Ababa 14026 (CONFIDENTIAL - LIMDIS)

CONFIDENTIAL

GDS

KJR 10/17/01



# Department of State

TELEGRAM

ASB

DW

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ 4338

PAGE 11 ADDIS 14026 251459Z

ACTION AF-04

INFO OCT-01 SS-14 ISO-00 SSD-00 INRE-00 NSCE-00 NSC-00

INR-05 CIAE-00 SP-02 PRS-01 EUR-00 EA-06 DODE-00 FM-03

L-01 EB-03 RSC-01 /054 W

103603

O R 251420Z NOV 74  
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 2010  
INFO AMCONSUL ASMARA  
USCINCEUR

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ ADDIS ABABA 14026

LIMDIS

E.O. 11552: GDS  
TAGC: PFOR MASS EAID ET US  
SUBJ: FIRST REFLECTIONS ON RECENT TURN OF EVENTS

1. SUMMARY. THE REMOVAL OF GENERAL AMAN AND THE EXECUTION OF 60 POLITICAL PRISONERS ON THE NIGHT OF NOVEMBER 23 HAVE LED A FURTHER RADICALIZATION OF THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION. WE EXPECT THE "RADICALS" IN THE ARMED FORCES COORDINATING COMMITTEE (AFCC) TO EXERCISE GREATER POWER IN THE NEW STAGE, HOWEVER LONG OR SHORT IT MAY BE, BUT IT IS STILL DIFFICULT TO FORESEE WHAT FORM THEIR RADICALISM WILL TAKE. A KEY ISSUE IN THIS RESPECT IS WHETHER THE PRESENT LEADERSHIP WILL WISH TO RETAIN THE TRADITIONAL CLOSE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE US, OR WILL TURN TO THE SOVIETS AND/OR CHINESE FOR MILITARY ASSISTANCE. WHILE IT WILL PROBABLY BE DESIRABLE TO CONTINUE US ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AT NORMAL LEVELS, WE INTEND TO AVOID FOR THE MOMENT CONCLUSION OF NEW AGREEMENTS PURSUANT TO THOSE PROGRAMS LEST THEY BE MISREAD AS A SIGN OF APPROVAL OR INDIFFERENCE TO THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE. END SUMMARY.

2. MOST OF THE MAJOR DEVELOPMENTS IN THE COURSE OF THE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

LR 16117101







# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

ADDIS 14026 251459Z

THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION SINCE THE ORIGINAL UPHEAVAL IN JANUARY THROUGH MARCH HAVE BEEN MARKED BY THE ACQUISITION OF GREATER POWER BY RADICAL ELEMENTS AT THE EXPENSE OF MODERATES. THE PRINCIPAL TURNING POINTS IN THIS RESPECT WERE THE SECOND GREAT WAVE OF ARRESTS AT THE END OF JUNE, THE REMOVAL OF ENDALKACHEW MAKONNEN ON JULY 22, THE DEPOSITION OF THE EMPEROR ON SEPTEMBER 12, AND NOW THE DISMISSAL OF GENERAL AMAN AND THE MASSACRE OF NOVEMBER 23. IT IS PROBABLE THAT THE RADICALS IN THE AFCC WILL WIELD EVEN MORE POWER IN THE NEW CHAPTER WHICH IS JUST BEGINNING THAN THEY DID WHILE THE MODERATELY-INCLINED AMAN WAS CHIEF OF STATE.

3. IT IS FAR EASIER, HOWEVER, TO DESIGNATE MANY MEMBERS OF THE AFCC AS RADICAL THAN IT IS TO DESCRIBE THE NATURE OF THEIR RADICALISM. THE PRINCIPAL REASON FOR THIS IS THAT MOST OF THESE RADICALS APPEAR TO BE CONSTRUCTING THEIR OWN PROGRAMS AND PRINCIPLES AS THEY GO ALONG RATHER THAN CARRYING OUT A PREVIOUSLY ESTABLISHED IDEOLOGICAL OR PARTY PROGRAM. WE DO NOT KNOW VERY MUCH ABOUT THEIR PRINCIPLES EXCEPT THAT THEIR EMPHASIS HAS BEEN ON HARSH PUNISHMENT RATHER THAN FAIR TRIALS, THAT THEY INCLINE TO FAVOR VIGOROUS MILITARY METHODS IN ERITRE, AND THAT RAPID SWEEPING MEASURES OF LAND REFORM APPEAL MORE TO THEM THAN A STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH. IN THE FIELD OF FOREIGN POLICY WE KNOW THAT THEY ARE AS A GROUP CONSIDERABLY MORE INCLINED THAN THE MODERATES TO ADVOCATE TURNING TO THE SOVIETS OR CHINESE AS A MEANS OF SOLVING THE SOMALI THREAT. JUST HOW GREAT THE LIKELIHOOD IS THAT THE NEW GOVERNMENT WILL MOVE IN THIS DIRECTION IS FAR FROM CLEAR, HOWEVER.

4. IT IS POSSIBLE THAT THE SELECTION OF A NEW CHIEF OF STATE WILL PROVIDE US WITH SIGNIFICANT EVIDENCE REGARDING THE INTENTION OF THE PRESENT DIRG LEADERS. IT SEEMS QUITE LIKELY, HOWEVER, THAT THE NEW CHIEF OF STATE WILL BE CHOSEN LARGELY FOR HIS WILLINGNESS TO TAKE ORDERS FROM THE DIRG. HIS SELECTION MAY THEREFORE LEAVE US LITTLE WISER THAN BEFORE.

5. THUS FAR INTO THE ETHIOPIAN REVOLUTION US POLICY HAS BEEN GUIDED BY TWO PRINCIPLES. THE FIRST IS THAT WE

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~





# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

PAGE 23 ADDIS 14826 251459Z

SHOULD NOT ONLY AVOID INTERVENTION IN THE SITUATION BUT SHOULD TRY HARD TO AVOID ACTIONS WHICH COULD READILY BE INTERPRETED AS INTERVENTION. THE SECOND PRINCIPLE HAS BEEN TO CONTINUE ALL OF OUR ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS AT FULL STRENGTH IN THE BELIEF THAT THIS WOULD HELP TO STRENGTHEN THE POSITION OF THOSE WHO WILL STRUGGLE FOR A CONTINUATION OF CLOSE AND FRIENDLY RELATIONS WITH THE US. IT WILL PROBABLY REMAIN DESIRABLE TO OBSERVE THESE TWO PRINCIPLES UNDER THE NEW CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, THE INFORMATION WHICH WE OBTAIN DURING THE COMING WEEKS REGARDING THE CAPABILITIES, POLICIES AND INTENTIONS OF THE NEW LEADERSHIP WILL PROVIDE VALUABLE ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE REGARDING THE POLICIES WE SHOULD PURSUE.

6. IN THE MEANTIME, WE MUST CONSIDER IMMEDIATELY WHAT OUR ATTITUDE SHOULD BE THIS WEEK REGARDING THE THREE MAJOR US ASSISTANCE PROGRAMS.

7. WITH REGARD TO DROUGHT ASSISTANCE, WE NOW HAVE AUTHORIZATION TO SIGN THE RECOVERY AND REHABILITATION AGREEMENT FOR THREE MILLION DOLLARS. TO DO SO NOW, HOWEVER, WOULD BE INTERPRETED BY MANY AS AN INDICATION THAT WE APPROVED OF THE SATURDAY NIGHT MASSACRE. WE WILL THEREFORE TAKE NO ACTION FOR THE TIME BEING TO ARRANGE FOR A SIGNATURE OF THIS AGREEMENT. WITH REGARD TO ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE, THE GOVERNMENT HAS NOT YET INDICATED WHETHER IT IS PREPARED TO SIGN THE AGRICULTURAL SECTOR LOAN WITH THE SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS ON DEVELOPMENT EXPENDITURES WHICH WE HAVE PROPOSED. WE WILL MAKE NO EFFORTS AT PRESENT TO EXPEDITE ITS DECISION. WITH REGARD TO MILITARY ASSISTANCE, WE WILL NOT DISCUSS FOR THE TIME BEING ANY SUBSTANTIVE CHANGES TO THE GRANT AID PORTION OF THE PROGRAM SUCH AS THE F-5A ISSUE. SINCE THE DECISION INTERFACE ON THE FMS CASH AND CREDIT PORTION OF THE PROGRAM IS IN WASHINGTON WITH THE ETHIOPIAN AMBASSADOR, NO CHANGE OF COURSE IS REQUIRED HERE IN THAT AREA.

WYMAN

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



## ISC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR		
11	27	11	29	10	740 5815	Horan

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES  
KISSINGER  
SCOWCROFT  
DAVISFROM: KISSINGER, H  
COLBY, W  
SCHLESINGER, J  
ST EX SECREFERENCE:  
S/S 7423338  
OTHERCIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE  
UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT  
NO FORN NODIS  
EYES ONLY EXDIS  
CODWORD  
TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT:

Acceptance of Economic & Military Aid to  
ETH/IOPA

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	INFO		
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA	X		X	APPROPRIATE ACTION
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR
ECONOMIC		X		ANY ACTION NECESSARY? X
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE: 12/02
NSC PLANNING		X		COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED IOR TAKEN:	CY TO
12/3	Horan		C	7 An per Horan	Horan

NSC/S DISP INSTR

DISPATCH		MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS: M/F'D BY		
CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:				
NOTIFY & DATE BY				
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:				
CROSS REF W/		CRT ID:	SA	SF
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:		OPEN	HP	NS
		CLOSE	WH	EP
			PA	DY





DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

7424546

6212

13

December 18, 1974

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on Ethiopia

Attached is an issues paper on Ethiopia for the  
Secretary's briefing of the President.

George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As noted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

AK 10/17/01





~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## ETHIOPIA

### BACKGROUND

The military leadership of the Ethiopian revolution no longer enjoys the widespread support in Ethiopia which was formerly the case. By imposing a Provisional Military Government (PMG) on the country, the revolutionary leaders have antagonized the academic community and organized labor; by killing former Prime Minister General Aman and executing 59 hostages from the old regime they have raised the level of emotion between antagonistic classes and sharpened the divisions within the military establishment. While the revolution's reform objectives are still widely shared by most of the population, the manner in which they are being pursued is now subject to increasing criticism.

The 100 or so young officers and enlisted men who constitute the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and who remain for the most part anonymous, still maintain a facade of unity, but there are reports of serious discontent. The PMAC's failure to consult with the Ethiopian military units outside of Addis Ababa is deeply resented. The United States has heard from some of the dissatisfied military that there is a reported plan of action afoot to discredit the new regime and eventually change or overthrow it.

The PMG is about to embark on a controversial program in the civil field and it appears to have military intentions in Eritrea; either of these moves could further exacerbate opposition and divisiveness. Sometime in December, 60,000 Ethiopian teachers and students are scheduled to go out to the countryside to advance literacy, explain the revolution to the rural population and participate in development projects. There seems to have been little effective planning or preparation for this campaign, and the disorganization which may ensue could seriously discredit the new government. Furthermore, the students and teachers in question are basically hostile to the PMG and could promote disapproval of the regime in the countryside.

The PMG is in the process of transferring additional forces to the province of Eritrea, where a separatist guerilla campaign has been underway since the early 1960's. General Aman's opposition to the dispatch of additional troops to the area, a step which the more militant elements in the PMAC

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS



had been demanding, may have contributed to his death. It is probable, but not yet certain, that these additional forces will be ordered to undertake military action against the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) insurgents even though the situation has been relatively quiet over the past few months. The reinforcements are not combat-trained or effective as a result of their many years of garrison service in the capital and if sent into combat could be badly defeated. The mere move north by these units will be considered provocative by the ELF.

Externally the PMG continues to be concerned, as were its predecessor governments, by the threat posed from neighboring Soviet-armed Somalia, which claims large parts of eastern Ethiopia populated by ethnic Somalis. This concern caused the governments of ex-Emperor Haile Selassie to request large supplies of modern US arms for defense against what the Ethiopians claimed to be an imminent Somali attack. This request was vigorously pursued by the PMG, which implied it would turn to the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China if the US was not responsive. The United States originally responded favorably to the Emperor's request, but the question of military deliveries is now under review in the light of the evolving political situation.

#### U.S. STRATEGY

The United States has had close relationships with Ethiopia and important interests there, including the Kagnev communications station established at Asmara since 1942, almost unlimited rights to the use of Ethiopia's airfields and ports, and for a considerable period the support and moderating influence of Ethiopia and its prestigious ruler in African and world councils.

More recently the strategic location of Ethiopia, close to the Middle East oil supplies and the Indian Ocean oil route and located on the Mediterranean to Indian Ocean sea passage, has provided added reason for our interest in a friendly Ethiopia and stability in the Horn of Africa. This increased strategic importance of Ethiopia has counterbalanced the recent phasing down of Kagnev Station. And although the deposition of Haile Selassie has diminished Ethiopian influence, developments unfavorable to the US or the West in this second-most populous country in black Africa could still have adverse repercussions for us in East Africa and the nearby Arab nations.



Our perception of Ethiopia's strategic importance was a significant factor in our favorable response to the Ethiopian request for additional arms. While we disagreed with the Ethiopian estimate that a Somali attack was imminent we believed a substantial US response was needed to the Somali-Soviet build-up if only to bolster Ethiopia's confidence in its ability to defend itself and in the US as a reliable associate. As the decision to provide increased military supplies was made for strategic reasons, it was extended in spite of the revolution which began in February 1974, and maintained after the deposition of Haile Selassie.

#### THE SITUATION NOW

The unpopularity of the PMAC resulting from its latest actions has increased the chances of further violence in Ethiopia; the present leadership's intentions in the fields of rural education and the Eritrean insurgency contribute to making its continued tenure uncertain. While, in response to US and other international pressures, the PMG has given assurances of a fair trial for the 150 or more hostages it still holds and denied a report that it intended to execute Haile Selassie, it could resort again to acts of ruthlessness.

On November 27, the day it was reported that the PMAC was preparing to execute Haile Selassie, and four days after the execution of the ex-officials, the US announced that our program of military assistance to Ethiopia was being reviewed. All military shipments to Ethiopia are now subject to case by case approval before they can go forward. The Ethiopians have been informed that the program is under review but not that current shipments are in question.

The eventual US decision on the continuation of military assistance and the manner in which it is conveyed will be an important factor determining the type of relations we are to have with the PMG. The decision will also be a matter of great interest domestically as US public attention to Ethiopia was aroused by the executions of November 23 and the subsequent reported threat to Haile Selassie's life. Also of interest, at home and abroad, will be the timing of the arrival of an American Ambassador, our mission in Addis Ababa having been under a Charge' since February of this year.

#### ISSUES AND OPTIONS

The principal issue at this time is whether the United States should continue to provide military supplies to Ethiopia



on the scale projected by decisions made earlier this year. These supplies would be worth about \$75 million (in grants, credits, and cash sales) during FY 75 as against an average of \$10 million per year through FY 73 and \$22 million in FY 74. The willingness of the Ethiopians to pay cash for a large proportion of the equipment they have requested from us means that they can purchase similar items elsewhere if we refuse to provide them.

The impact of our decision will be more political than military. A cessation or reduction of military aid would be taken as a sign that the US does not support the present regime and may actively oppose it. This could drive the PMG to seek arms from Communist countries. While we do not believe that either the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China is prepared to supply arms in the quantities the Ethiopians want, they may take the opportunity to supply at least token amounts. Such an inroad by either Communist power would improve its standing in Addis Ababa and in East Africa at our expense.

Our decision may also have important internal consequences. Full continuation of military deliveries, while showing the continued importance Ethiopia has in US eyes, could also be interpreted as unqualified backing of the present regime, regardless of its past or future behavior. This could seriously discourage the moderate elements now in opposition to the PMAC, bolster the PMAC's present vulnerable position, or associate us closely with a government which could soon be in serious trouble.

On the other hand cessation of deliveries, while indicating disapproval of the military regime, could be interpreted as a loss of US interest in Ethiopia. It could also be taken as a signal by the opposition and spur it into an attempt to modify or overthrow the present leadership of the PMAC. An unsuccessful coup attempt could lead to the decimation of the moderate opposition. Moreover, even in the absence of opposition activity, an abrupt cessation of deliveries could alarm the PMAC and cause it to take severe repressive action in order to ensure its hold on power.

Between the extremes of unqualified continuation of military assistance and abrupt cessation are two middle courses: qualified continuation, in effect putting the PMAC on its good behavior and maintaining the possibility of a future suspension; or selective temporary reduction of arms supplies pending a



clearer understanding of the situation in Ethiopia and the intentions of its present rulers, particularly in regard to relations with the United States. Either of these courses contains the risk of antagonizing the PMAC; but both have the advantage of putting the burden of proof on the Ethiopian rulers with regard to their intentions and attitude toward the United States.

#### NEXT STEPS

While we would like to delay a decision on arms assistance to Ethiopia as long as possible, so that we can decide on the basis of a better understanding of the present situation and the best possible indications of future developments, we may not be able to put it off much longer.

The Ethiopian Ambassador requested clarification from us on December 16 concerning US policies on economic and military assistance and told us he intends to resume talks with the Pentagon about arms purchases on credit. We have told him that the United States wants to continue with the new and emerging regime in Ethiopia the close and mutually beneficial relations we have enjoyed with previous governments. At this point, however, we lack information as to the nature of the new regime and what sort of relationship it desires to have with the United States. Until we have a clearer picture, we must continue to review the situation carefully.

Any extended delay in proceeding with the sales desired by the Ethiopians would in effect represent a choice of the selective temporary reduction option cited above, particularly as they wish to use credits already proffered (prior to the November executions).

If it is decided to proceed with the arms sales, the Ethiopians could be put on notice that further military deliveries would continue to depend upon our perception of the present government's attitude and intentions in regard to relations with the United States. The timing of an Ambassador will also convey an important signal.



DOC		RECD			CG NBR	INITIAL ACTION Q
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7406312	
12	18	12	18	20		

D SPATCH _____		MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS _____	
CY RQMTS SEE ABOVE PLUS _____		M/F/O _____ BY _____	
NOTIFY _____ & DATE _____ BY _____		CART ID: _____	
SPECIAL DISPOSITION _____		OPEN _____	
CROSS REF W/ _____		CLOSE <i>[Signature]</i>	
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED <i>[X]</i> _____		SA SF HP NS WH EP DA DY	
FOLDER _____			



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 2, 1975  
INFORMATION

SECRET-GDS

## MEMORANDUM FOR BRENT SCOWCROFT

FROM: Hal Horan *HH*

SUBJECT: US policy toward Ethiopia - Economic and  
military assistance

As indicated in the attached State Department memorandum, supplied at NSC request, the Secretary has approved the basic policy of continuing US economic and military assistance to Ethiopia in the absence of any action by the Provisional Military Government inimical to US interests.

Under the Secretary's approved guidelines, the Department must review each assistance matter on a case by case basis before proceeding with it in the light of all the circumstances at the time. This will permit State now to go forward with some pending military credit and cash-sales and economic programs with Ethiopia.

## Attachment

Cy of 12/24/74 in-State memo (Easum to the Secretary)

SECRET-GDS

*NR 12/25*





DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S

DEC 24 1974

#7424983

~~SECRET~~ - With EXDIS Attachment

To: The Secretary

Through: P - Mr. Sisco  
T - Mr. Maw *2/4*

From: AF - Donald B. Easum *9/1*

Economic and Military Assistance to Ethiopia

The Problem

Ambassador Kifle (Foreign Minister-designate) of Ethiopia, has been instructed by his government to continue discussions with Defense regarding the purchase of additional arms and military equipment under the \$8.3 million in Foreign Military Sales (FMS) credits and cash sales authorizations previously extended. The credit purchases would involve M-60 tanks. The cash sales could involve F-5's, Vulcans, armored personnel carriers, AIM missiles, and TOW launchers and missiles.

We have indicated to the Ethiopian government our willingness to maintain friendly relations based on mutual respect and interests. There has been a normal continuation of pipeline shipments, and now we are at the point where we face more important decisions with respect to the actual delivery of more meaningful, individual military assistance items and our willingness to conclude new economic assistance arrangements. Kifle's forthcoming talks in Defense, referred to below, will center on our willingness to sell and deliver such items of military hardware as 11 M-60 tanks under the credit and, perhaps, 12 F-5E's, 32 Vulcan anti-aircraft cannon,

~~SECRET~~

GDS

*AK 10/17/01*



some armored personnel carriers, a quantity of war reserve ammunition, and 126 AIM-9B launchers under the \$53 million cash purchase authorization. Six TOW launchers and 120 TOW missiles might also figure in the cash sales talks. These are all high profile items to which the Ethiopian military regime undoubtedly attaches considerable importance.

### Background/Analysis

We believe the announcement of Ambassador Hummel's appointment and his planned arrival in Ethiopia in January will provide significant evidence of our forthcoming disposition toward the Ethiopian regime. We also believe talks held by Don Easum and Joe Sisco have made clear that our position is to continue US-Ethiopian cooperation in terms of our mutual benefits and mutual interests, assuming, of course, the absence of any sign from them that they wish to pursue a different course. During a meeting with Ambassador Kifle on December 23rd Ambassador Kifle responded appreciatively to Mr. Sisco's statement that the USC intends to pursue the friendly and cooperative policy it has always pursued toward Ethiopia in the past, based on mutual interests. When he was asked by Mr. Sisco regarding the attitude of the PMAC toward the US, Kifle expressed the opinion that it was basically positive with the new government having two principal priorities: "internal reconstruction" and defense. Kifle will meet with Defense officials in early January to work out specific additional details of the on-going military assistance program.

The up-coming discussions in Defense, and the fact that we have not interrupted our military deliveries to Ethiopia (although, unknown to the Ethiopians, each delivery has been carefully scrutinized in terms of whether it should be made), should go far to signal a positive policy toward the new regime. At the same time, our case-by-case review permits us to take account of developments as they occur and to adjust our delivery policy as necessary. For example, during the next few weeks we will want to watch how the recently-enunciated policy



of "Ethiopian socialism" is translated into action by the inexperienced, nationalistic and young military leadership.

You will recall that we stated publicly on November 27 that our economic and military assistance programs to Ethiopia were under review. Since that time we have refrained from entering into any new economic or military assistance agreements, while continuing military deliveries after review. Kifle naturally hopes his talks with Defense will be productive in view of the priority the regime attaches to obtaining new equipment. We believe that any extended delay on our part in concluding arrangements for the military sales Kifle has requested, and which were approved in principle prior to the executions, will be taken by the PMG as evidence that we have, in fact, decided to curtail future military deliveries to Ethiopia. The consequences of such an understanding on the part of the PMG could be serious, as discussed in the attached Issues Paper (Tab B). On the other hand, to proceed with such sales and other scheduled military deliveries without weighing all relevant circumstances at the time could lead falsely to the conclusion that the review is over and that we have decided to back the PMG regardless of whether or not it wants good relations with the US.

#### Economic Assistance

We believe the regime remains anxious to obtain US economic assistance which would fit into its programs of domestic reform and relieve the economy of some of the worst effects of the drought and of a depressed agriculture.

AID has various projects for Ethiopia in different stages of development. These are the following:



First priority - project ready to go as soon as green light is given.

-- Signing of agreement for \$3 million in recovery and rehabilitation (R&R) funds for assistance in agriculture, crop protection and water development.

-- Signing of \$460,000 project agreement for pulses project (technical assistance in improving pulses production).

-- Signing of \$15 million Agricultural Sector loan.

-- Approval of new participant training in agricultural and educational fields in the amount of \$300,000.

Second priority - project ready to go by end of December.

-- Approval of additional \$4.6 million in R&R funds for rural road construction.

-- Approval of \$6.8 million for highway maintenance equipment.

Third priority - decisions required sometime in January.

-- Approval of final \$400,000 in R&R funds.

-- Signing of \$4 million malaria loan.

-- Provision of additional 10,-20,000 tons of wheat under PL-480 for drought assistance.

If you approve the course of action described below, AID would proceed with these projects in the same way as we would handle new military deliveries and agreements: on a case-by-case basis.



Proposed Courses of Action

In the absence of any PMG action inimical to US interests, we would continue to handle US military and economic assistance on a case-by-case basis, authorizing each one only after a review of all relevant facts. To the Ethiopians our stance would appear to be outwardly positive.

We believe this procedure would have three advantages. First, it would assure the PMG that, unless they chose otherwise, they could receive the military and economic assistance they need from us and thereby possibly remove any pretext for seeking it from the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China. It would also leave us maximum flexibility to react in terms of future developments. Finally, it would place the burden of responsibility for any future weakening of US-Ethiopian relations squarely on the Ethiopians.

Recommendations:

1. That we continue US economic and military assistance to Ethiopia in the absence of any action by the Provisional Military Government inimical to US interests, but review each assistance matter on a case-by-case basis before proceeding with it in the light of all the circumstances at the time.

(per Secto 001, para. 6)

Approve XXX Disapprove                     

2. That we call in Ambassador Kifle before his departure for Addis to confirm the above policy.

(per Secto 001, para. 6)

Approve XXX Disapprove                     

Attachments:

Tab A - State 277147

Tab B - Issues Paper

Drafted: AF/E:RSEarrett:AF:JJBlake:rjp  
12/24/74 x29478 S/S #7424983



# NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		MO DA		MO DA		HR	
12/31/74		12/31/74		12/31/74		12/31/74		12/31/74	

INITIAL ACTION O

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION

TO: PRES	FROM: KISSINGER, H	REFERENCE: 7425487	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE
KISSINGER	COLBY, W	S/S	UNCLAS LOG IN/OUT
SCOWCROFT	SCHLESINGER, J	OTHER	LOU NO FORM NODIS
DAVIS	ST EX SEC		C EYES ONLY EXDIS
			S CODEWORD
			TS SENSITIVE

SUBJECT: *Copy of Internal State Memo to the Sec On Economic & Military Aid to China*

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT

INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC	ACTION REQUIRED
	ACTION	NFO	FOR	
ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA				APPROPRIATE ACTION
MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO
EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR
ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY?
SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE
PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE
NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
CONGRESSIONAL				
OCEANS POLICY				
INTELLIGENCE				

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS

DATE	FROM	TO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN)	CY TO
01/02			C	For record in case	
01/02	Swift	UX		Reopened / Draft	
4/29			C	Noted by Snow	

NSC/S INSTR

DISPATCH		
CY ROMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:		
NOTIFY & DATE	BY	
SPECIAL DISPOSITION:		
CROSS REF W/		
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X	FOLDER:	

MICROFILM & FILE ROMTS:	
CRIT ID 13	SA SF
OPEN	HP NS
CLOSE	EP
	DY





C O P Y

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

WASH DC 20520

CS/S 7500524

201

January 10, 1975

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM FOR LIEUTENANT GENERAL BRENT SCOWCROFT  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Issues Paper on Ethiopia

Attached is an updated paper on Ethiopia for  
the Secretary's briefing of the President.

*George S. Springsteen*  
George S. Springsteen  
Executive Secretary

Attachment:

As noted.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

## ETHIOPIA

### BACKGROUND

The military leadership of the Ethiopian revolution no longer enjoys the widespread support in Ethiopia which was formerly the case. By imposing the Provisional Military Government (PMG) on the country, the revolutionary leaders antagonized the academic community and organized labor; by killing former Prime Minister General Aman and executing 59 hostages from the old regime they raised the level of emotion between antagonistic classes and sharpened the divisions within the military establishment. While the revolution's reform objectives are still widely shared by most of the population, the manner in which they are being pursued has been subject to increasing criticism.

The 100 or so young officers and enlisted men who constitute the ruling Provisional Military Administrative Council (PMAC), and who remain for the most part anonymous, still maintain a facade of unity, but there have been reports of serious discontent. The PMAC's failure to consult with the Ethiopian military units outside of Addis Ababa, especially on the executions, has been deeply resented. We were told by some of the dissatisfied military in late November that there was a reported plan of action afoot to discredit the new regime and eventually change or overthrow it, but have heard no more about it since that time.

The PMG is about to embark on a controversial program in the civil field which could further exacerbate opposition and divisiveness. Sometime in January about 50,000 Ethiopian teachers and students are scheduled to go out to the countryside to advance literacy, explain the revolution to the rural population and participate in development projects. There seems to have been little effective planning or preparation for this campaign, the starting date has been repeatedly set back, and the disorganization which may ensue could further discredit the new government. Furthermore, many students and teachers are basically against the PMG and could promote hostility to the regime in the countryside.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

GDS

The PMG's recent handling of the 10-year old Eritrean insurgency has not improved its standing. It initially took a hard line toward the insurgent Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF) transferring additional troops to the north to deal with it. When the arrival of these reinforcements in late December triggered a wave of violence in the Eritrean capital of Asmara the PMG hastily sent a delegation to talk with Eritrean "community leaders" in an effort to calm the situation, and then just as hastily agreed to a demand by these leaders that it meet directly with the ELF on the subject of a political settlement. If these talks eventuate the PMG will enter them from a position of weakness having gone precipitously from an intransigent stance to forced acceptance of direct contacts.

On December 20 the PMG announced that "Ethiopian socialism" would be its policy and on January 1 the nationalization of all banks and insurance companies was proclaimed. The economic policy of the new regime is still vaguely worded, however, and it remains to be seen how far it intends to apply socialist doctrine. American companies held a minority interest in two of the nationalized firms but the nationalization proclamation stated that appropriate compensation would be paid.

Externally the PMG continues to be concerned, as were its predecessor governments, by the threat posed from neighboring Soviet-armed Somalia, which claims large parts of eastern Ethiopia populated by ethnic Somalis. This concern caused the governments of ex-Emperor Haile Selassie to request large supplies of modern US arms for defense against what the Ethiopians claimed to be an imminent Somali attack. This request was vigorously pursued by the PMG, which implied it would turn to the Soviet Union or the People's Republic of China if the US was not responsive. While the US did respond favorably to the Emperor's request and military deliveries have continued under the new regime, we are presently reviewing each assistance matter on a case-by-case basis.

#### U.S. STRATEGY

The United States has had close relationships with Ethiopia and important interests there, including the Kagnev communications station established at Asmara since 1942, almost unlimited rights to the use of Ethiopia's airfields

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



and ports, and for a considerable period the support and moderating influence of Ethiopia and its prestigious ruler in African and world councils.

More recently the strategic location of Ethiopia, close to the Middle East oil supplies and the Indian Ocean oil route and located on the Mediterranean to Indian Ocean sea passage, has provided added reason for our interest in a friendly Ethiopia and stability in the Horn of Africa. This increased strategic importance of Ethiopia has counterbalanced the recent phasing down of Kagnev Station. And although the deposition of Haile Selassie has diminished Ethiopian influence, developments unfavorable to the US or the West in this second most populous country in black Africa could still have adverse repercussions for us in East Africa and the nearby Arab nations.

Our perception of Ethiopia's strategic importance was a significant factor in our favorable response to the Ethiopian request for additional arms. While we disagreed with the Ethiopian estimate that a Somali attack was imminent we believed a substantial US response was needed to the Somali-Soviet build-up if only to bolster Ethiopia's confidence in its ability to defend itself and in the US as a historic friend. Because of our long-term historical and strategic interest in Ethiopia, we maintained this view despite the revolution which began in February 1974, and after the deposition of Haile Selassie.

#### THE SITUATION NOW

The unpopularity of the PMAC resulting from its recent actions has increased the chances of further violence in Ethiopia. While, in response to US and other international pressures, the PMG has given assurances of a fair trial for the 150 or more hostages it still holds and denied a report that it intended to execute Haile Selassie, it could resort again to acts of ruthlessness. The reported opposition, within and outside of the PMAC, to the present leadership has shown no sign of action.

On November 27, the day it was reported that the PMG was preparing to execute Haile Selassie, and four days after the execution of the ex-officials, we stated that our program of economic and military assistance to Ethiopia was being reviewed. The Ethiopians were informed of this overall review but not of a simultaneously imposed requirement for specific approval of each subsequent military shipment.

On December 23 we informed the Ethiopian Ambassador that it was US policy to continue our friendly relations with Ethiopia as mutually beneficial and in our mutual interests, and that, unless the PMG gave any indication to the contrary, we would assume a similar attitude on the part of Ethiopia. At that time we also told him that the Department of Defense was prepared to continue the discussions on military assistance which had been held over a period of time.

On December 26 it was decided to maintain our existing policy on military shipments, continuing these shipments in the absence of any PMG action inimical to the United States, but reviewing each one in the light of the circumstances at the time. It was also decided to inform the Ethiopian Ambassador that such shipments would continue and we shall do so upon his return from Ethiopia where he has gone to obtain clarification on his government's intentions in the military procurement field. These actions plus the announcement on January 3 of the appointment of an American Ambassador should leave the Ethiopians in no doubt that, for our part, we are disposed to continued cooperation with the military regime.

#### ISSUES AND OPTIONS

While the above actions have set the near-term course for US policy toward Ethiopia, it is possible that the PMG could take some action either inimical to our interests or otherwise objectionable which would require us to reconsider our position. We would then have to make a judgment in the light of the existing circumstances concerning such matters as continuation of military shipments and economic aid. Examples of such Ethiopian actions would be further summary executions, use of American weapons against the civilian population in Eritrea, a further tightening of military rule, or failure to pay compensation for foreign-owned nationalized properties.

Another issue which could arise would be whether to provide military equipment over and above the grant, loan, and cash sales package proffered in 1974. We have recently received indications that the PMG may want to increase the amount of either grant and credit assistance and/or the cash sales authorized. In the grant/credit field the Ethiopians may be encouraged by the inclusion in the recently passed foreign aid legislation of a provision for Presidential waiver of the African ceiling which had previously limited our provision of such



assistance to Africa to \$40 million. Reports from Addis Ababa also indicate that the PMG may now be willing to spend lavishly from its own monetary reserves for needed military equipment, whereas it had previously stated that it could use these reserves only for economic development.

A request for more arms would require careful consideration on our part: a negative reply could antagonize the PMG and jeopardize our position in this strategically important area; on the other hand accession to the request could, by granting more military assistance to the PMG than to the preceding Haile Selassie regime, further strengthen and identify us with a government whose future policies are uncertain.

#### NEXT STEPS

We are processing ongoing military shipments, but other actions in the military assistance field await completion of the necessary documentation by the Ethiopians. The return of the Ethiopian Ambassador (who is also the Foreign Minister-designate, to Washington, expected in a few days, should provide us with a more accurate picture of the Ethiopian military's present desires. The arrival of our Ambassador in Addis Ababa in a few weeks may enable us better to understand the present situation in Ethiopia and perceive possible future developments.

<sup>PJB</sup>  
Drafted:AF/E:RSBarrett

Clearance: AF - Mr. Blake



DOC		RECD			G NBR	INITIAL ACTION O
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7500201	
1	10	1	10	76		

SUBJECT

#### INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION

ADVANCE CYS TO HAN/CONCROBT

**STAFF SECRETARY**

FAR EAST

SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA

MID EAST / NO AFRICA SO AS A

EUROPE / CANADA

LATIN AMERICA

UNITED NATIONS

ECONOMIC

SCIENTIFIC

### PROGRAM ANALYSIS

## N3C PLANNING

CONGRESSIONAL

## OCEANS POLICY

INTELLIGENCE

DATE \_\_\_\_\_

FROM

TO

3

SUBS EQUEST ACTION REQ REQ FOR TAKEN

Cv TO

DISPATCH

CY REQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:

NOTIFY \_\_\_\_\_ &amp; DATE \_\_\_\_\_



M/F'D

By

**SPECIAL DISPOSITION:**

CROSS REF W/

SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED:

**FOLDER:**

**MICROFILM & FILE ROOMS:**

M/F'D

By

CAT ID.

3A

SF

OPEN

HA

52

**CLOSE**

44

EF

PA

D v

NATIONAL ARCHIVES AND RECORDS ADMINISTRATION  
Presidential Libraries Withdrawal Sheet

WITHDRAWAL ID 014196

REASON FOR WITHDRAWAL . . . . National security restriction

TYPE OF MATERIAL . . . . . Memorandum

DESCRIPTION . . . . . Re Eritrea and Ethiopia

CREATION DATE . . . . . 02/26/1975

VOLUME . . . . . 10 pages

COLLECTION/SERIES/FOLDER ID . 032300031

COLLECTION TITLE . . . . . NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISER. PRESIDENTIAL  
COUNTRY FILES FOR AFRICA

BOX NUMBER . . . . . 2

FOLDER TITLE . . . . . Ethiopia

DATE WITHDRAWN . . . . . 10/24/2001

WITHDRAWING ARCHIVIST . . . . . HJR

**REDACTED**

8/27/08



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

OCI No. 0435/75

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY  
Directorate of Intelligence  
February 26, 1975

MEMORANDUM

SUBJECT: Eritrea and Ethiopia

Ethiopia's 27 million people are culturally diverse and speak many languages. The country--three times the size of California--consists of isolated mountain plateaus and desert lowlands which have separated Ethiopians from each other and from the rest of the world.

Successive Ethiopian emperors, who have taken pride in their ties with the Mediterranean world extending back to biblical times, have over the centuries fought a see-saw battle from their mountain strongholds against Arab and other Muslim invaders from the lowlands. Strong Emperors were able to make local feudal lords submit to central authority, while weaker emperors had their territorial sway reduced.

Eritrea, on the fringes of the empire, was only sporadically and tenuously controlled from the Ethiopian capital. For about 400 years, the Ottoman Turks controlled the Red Sea coast, spreading Islam in the region. During the half-century of Italian rule over Eritrea, beginning in 1890, roads and railways were built, and modern agriculture, industry, education, and administration were introduced. After the UK ousted Italy in 1941, London encouraged the development of labor unions and political parties, and also established an elected legislature. Politically-conscious Eritreans became aware of the extent to which they had outstripped the rest of Ethiopia, developing in the process a separate political tradition.

In accordance with an earlier decision by the UN General Assembly, Eritrea in 1952 became part of Ethiopia, but retained a significant degree of autonomy. Haile Selassie

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED • E.O. 12958 SEC. 3.8  
WITH PORTIONS EXEMPTED  
E.O. 12958 SEC. 1.5

MR 07-20, #3; CIA REC 8/27/07

BY dal NARA DATE 8/28/08

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

gradually whittled down this autonomous status, and in 1962 reduced Eritrea to just another province--spurring Eritrean resentment and giving a boost to separatist movements.

Eritrea's approximately 2 million people are divided about equally into Christians and Muslims. There are other social divisions based on language, ethnic affiliation, and way of life. The province, about the size of Pennsylvania, consists of the humid Red Sea littoral; a cooler, better-watered central highland area where Asmara is located; and the hot, dry lowlands next to the Sudanese border. Population is unevenly distributed, with most people concentrated in the highlands or in relatively hospitable territory around the port of Massawa.

Until recently, support for the separatists came primarily from the Muslim herdsmen of the lowlands. The Christians, most of whom are settled agriculturalists in the highlands, were traditionally more amenable to some kind of continuing relationship with Ethiopia. The killing of General Aman in November 1974 and the reversion of the Ethiopian government to a hard line on Eritrea has undoubtedly increased support for independence among the Christian Eritreans.

If Eritrea becomes independent the status of its southeastern portion, inhabited by the Danakils, will be a question mark. The Danakils are primitive tribesmen, whose ferocity and desert environment has caused the Ethiopian government to leave them pretty much on their own. The Danakil are hostile to external authority, and it is uncertain whether the Eritreans could reach an accommodation with them.

An independent Eritrea would become another small African country with a poor natural resource base and a minuscule domestic market. Eritrea has a limited agricultural potential. Cultivated land is only about 3 percent of the total. Grain now supplied from the Ethiopian hinterland would have to be imported, even in years of good harvest. Eritrea's greatest agricultural wealth is in livestock.

Eritrea has some industrial establishments, including a refinery at Assab--now supplied with crude from Saudi Arabia--a cement plant at Massawa, and various small agricultural-processing and consumer goods-producing facilities. Thus far exploration for minerals has had disappointing results.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

The viability of Eritrea as a separate state would depend on foreign aid and investments, and on maintaining sufficient political stability to encourage foreign businessmen and technicians to remain. Eritrea's prospects would be considerably boosted by the return from Addis Ababa of Eritreans with business and commercial skills, and by a future willingness of Ethiopia to do business with the Eritreans. The ports of Massawa and Assab could continue to handle Ethiopian exports and imports.

Ethiopia is already one of the world's poorest nations, but it would continue to be viable even if it lost Eritrea. Ethiopia's people lack modern skills, there are few mineral resources, the manufacturing sector is tiny, and agriculture is inefficient and subject to the vagaries of weather and world prices.

The loss of Eritrea would make Ethiopia even more isolated, and would further hamper presently inadequate transportation and marketing facilities. The loss of its seacoast and ports would be a bitter blow for Ethiopia, but economically the impact would be mitigated by Ethiopia's continuing use of Djibouti, in the French territory of Afars and Issas. At present Djibouti, which is linked by road and railway to Ethiopia, is Ethiopia's major ocean port, handling almost two-thirds of its exports by value, and importing much of the iron, steel and other raw materials for the small industrial sector.

Eritrean rebel spokesmen have publicly stated their willingness to negotiate a settlement which would permit continued Ethiopian use of the Eritrean ports of Massawa and Assab. Assuming Eritrea had won its independence, Ethiopia would be under considerable economic pressure to accept such an arrangement. Massawa and Assab are the logical seaports for northern and western Ethiopia, and reliance on Djibouti as the port of entry for all the country's needs, however, does not seem feasible. Moreover, Ethiopia's loss of its only petroleum refinery at Assab would add to its economic difficulties.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

# Ethiopia

————— International boundary  
 ————— Province boundary  
 @ National capital  
 O Province capital  
 ————— Road

0 50 100 Kilometers  
 0 50 100 Miles







# Ethiopia

## Eritrea Province

- Province boundary
- Religious boundary
- name of Ethnic group

Population  
 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ACTION

October 22, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT

FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER <sup>4</sup>

SUBJECT: Notification to Congress of FMS Case Over  
\$25 million; Ethiopia

As you know, we have pending a notification to Congress of our intent to sell 16 F-5Es to Ethiopia. The matter is sensitive because Eritrean insurgents, who object to our arms supply to Ethiopia, hold four American hostages and might retaliate against them if the proposed F-5E sales become known.

In our memorandum to you of October 7 we pointed out that the danger to the hostages must be balanced against the severe strain to our relations with Ethiopia of any substantial delay of the F5 sale. Since then, the issue has been complicated by several new factors:

- Ambassador Hummel has pointed out that delay of notification to Congress beyond October 24 will make necessary renegotiation of the Letter of Offer, with consequent delay and possible serious Ethiopian reaction (cable attached).
- At Mr. Sisco direction, George Vest has notified Senators Clark and Case, and Congressmen Diggs and Fascell of our intentions to send notification forward on the classified basis. Their reaction was one of distaste but not outrage. All agreed, however, that there is substantial opposition in Congress to such a sale, and that the facts will leak to the press very quickly.
- We have now agreed in principle to direct (albeit limited) contacts with the insurgents to try and secure the release of the hostages. No date or place has yet been set for these contacts.

Subject to GDS of E.O. 11652.  
Automatically declassified  
December 31, 1981.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

HR 101.8/01



Under the circumstances there are no good choices, but the best available seems to be support for State's proposal for confidential notification. We cannot rule out possible harm to the hostages if the sale becomes public knowledge through Congressional leaks; but their safety, even if we delay the sale, is not assured. What is certain is that delay of the sale for any reason will cause severe strains in our relations with the Ethiopians and strengthen the hands of the radical elements in the present regime. On balance, therefore, we recommend NSC concurrence in State's proposal to notify Congress on a confidential basis of the proposed sale.

RECOMMENDATION

That you agree to our concurrence in State's proposal to notify Congress confidentially of the planned F-5E sale to Ethiopia.

Approve



Disapprove

\_\_\_\_\_

Les Janka and Hal Horan concur.

## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDSACTION

October 7, 1975

MEMORANDUM FOR: GENERAL SCOWCROFT  
FROM: CLINTON E. GRANGER<sup>34</sup>  
SUBJECT: Notification to Congress of FMS Case  
Over \$25 Million; Ethiopia

Pursuant to the requirement of Section 3c (B) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, the Department of Defense is prepared to transmit a Letter of Offer to the government of Ethiopia for 16 F-5E aircraft and supporting equipment/services. The value of this sale is \$72.7 million.

Eritrean insurgents currently hold four American hostages and have demanded as a condition of their release that the US end its arms shipments to Ethiopia. Notification to Congress of the F5 deal could make more difficult negotiations with the insurgents and even endanger these hostages. On the other hand, delaying this sale, which the Ethiopians are anxious to conclude, would cause strains on bilateral relations and might be construed as bowing to terrorist demands. Moreover, we have no assurance that such delay would improve chances for release of the hostages. On balance, therefore, I believe we should proceed with notification to Congress.

RECOMMENDATION

That we concur in notification to Congress of the proposed sale of F5 aircraft to Ethiopia.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

<sup>7/4</sup> Hal Horan and Les Janka concur.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - GDS

REL 10/18/75





# Department of State TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~ 6773

PAGE 01 ADO'S 12392 201924Z

44  
ACTION 39-15

INFO COT-01 AF-06 ISO-00 SSU-00 NSC-05 NSCE-00 PM-04 L-03

M-72 INR-07 INRE-00 1043 W

051348

C R 201321Z OCT 75  
FM AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 6742  
INFO SECDEF IMMEDIATE  
CSAF  
DISTINCEUR

~~SECRET~~ ADDIS ABABA 12392

FOR UNDERSECRETARY SYSCO, UNDERSECRETARY MAN, ISA DEPUTY  
ASSISTANT SECRETARY NOYES FROM AMB HUMMEL


REF: 11082: GDS

TAGS: MASS

SUBJ: IMPENDING DISASTROUS DELAY IN F5E PROCUREMENT WITHIN USG

SUMMARY I HAVE JUST LEARNED FROM MILITARY MESSAGE THAT LETTER  
OF OFFER (LOA) FOR F5E SALE TO EPMG HAS NOT YET BEEN DELIVERED  
TO CONGRESS FOR TWENTY-DAY REVIEW. YET WE ARE RUNNING INTO  
DEADLINE OF NOV 14 AT WHICH TIME LOA WILL EXPIRE, AND BECAUSE  
OF FIRM ADMINISTRATIVE AND PROCUREMENT PROBLEMS CANNOT BE  
REINSTATED OR EXTENDED WITHOUT VERY CONSIDERABLE DALAY, AND  
REAL POSSIBILITY THAT OTHER CLAIMANTS FOR AIRCRAFT WILL REOPEN  
WHOLE CASE. THE IMPACT ON US-EPMG RELATION WILL BE SEVERE  
IF FURTHER LONG DALY IS CAUSED BY EXECUTIVE BRANCH INACTION  
IN THIS IMPORTANT (AND TO EPMG CRUCIAL) PROCUREMENT CASE.  
YOUR PROMPT ATTENTION IS REQUESTED, END SUMMARY

1. SUBMITTED A LETTER OF INTENT FOR F-5E'S PURCHASE IN  
DECEMBER 1974. IN APRIL 1975 EMBASSY ADDIS DESCRIBED THE  
POLITICAL PERIL OF CONTINUED AMERICAN INDIFFERENCE TO THE  
REQUEST. IN JUNE 1975 WE WERE ADVISED THAT OOD/STATE HAD AGREED  
TO SALE OF SIXTEEN F-5E AIRCRAFT AND CHAAG IMMEDIATELY INFORMED  
THE MONU. THEN, THERE OCCURED A PERIOD OF ETHIOPIAN TACTICAL



# Department of State

# TELEGRAM

~~SECRET~~

PAGE 1 1000 12300 2015042

PLANS DURING WHICH THE ETHIOPIAN GOVERNMENT LINKED THE EMBASSY TO  
OTHER INTERNATIONAL SECURITY ASSISTANCE ISSUES.

2. SECDEF REPORTED IN LATE SEPTEMBER THAT AN E-EE LOA WAS BEING  
GENERATED BY USAF FOR STATE APPROVAL AND THAT OSAA ANTICIPATED  
SENDING THE CASE FOR CONGRESSIONAL APPROVAL DURING FIRST WEEK OF  
OCTOBER. AN AF S. INFORMED HQ. THE SECDEF TEAM AND THE CSAF  
TEAM WERE IN COUNTRY DURING OCTOBER AND WERE UNDER IMPRESSION  
THAT THE LOA WAS BEING SENT TO CONGRESS ON/ABOUT 6 OCTOBER  
BUT THAT THE TWENTY-DAY REVIEW PERIOD WAS IN PROGRESS.


3. THE TWENTY-DAY CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND THE CONCURRENT  
COUNTRY LOA PRESENTATIONS BY MAADIERE DESIGNED TO PERMIT THE  
ETHIOPIANS ADEQUATE TIME TO PREPARE THEMSELVES FOR ACCEPTANCE OF  
THE LOA BEFORE 14 NOVEMBER 1975. EXPLICIT IN ALL LOA BRIEFINGS  
FOR THE ETHIOPIANS AND OSAAAS WAS BEEN THE ABSOLUTE ESSENTIALITY  
OF E-EE ACCEPTANCE BEFORE 14 NOVEMBER 1975.

4. NOW WE LEARN THAT STATE DEPT HAS NOT YET SENT THE LOA, THAT  
THE LOA EXPIRES 14 NOVEMBER 1975, TO CONGRESS FOR REVIEW.  
AS I UNDERSTAND THE PROBLEM, THE ETHIOPIANS CANNOT EFFECTIVELY  
ALTER THE LOA UNTIL AFTER THE TWENTY-DAY TERM OF THE  
CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW AND THEY MUST ACCEPT BEFORE 14 NOVEMBER  
1975 IN ORDER TO AVOID INTOLERABLE DELIVERY DELAYS. THE  
LOA TO BE DELIVERED TO CONGRESS BEFORE 20 OCTOBER 1975. THE  
LOA SEEMS THIS WHOLE EFFORT WILL FAIL.

5. I BELIEVE ADDRESSEES FULLY UNDERSTAND VERY GREAT IMPORTANCE  
OF THIS PROCUREMENT ACTION, AS A TEST OF USG  
ABILITY TO BE RELIABLE SUPPLIER OF ESSENTIAL MILITARY  
EQUIPMENT. YESTERDAY I HAD VERY FRANK TALK WITH JERMIN AYALEW  
AND HE IN UNMISTAKABLY BLUNT TERMS THAT THIS PROCUREMENT  
WAS MOST IMPORTANT ELEMENT IN DETERMINING ATTITUDE TOWARD US,  
AMONG HOSTILE AND RACIAL ELEMENTS IN POLITICAL CIRC. HE EMPHASIZE  
THAT NECESSARY DELAYS IN PROCUREMENT OF AGE AND SPARES  
ARE ALREADY A SERIOUS FACTOR IN DIRG ATTITUDES. I MUST SAY  
FRANKLY THAT IF USG EXECUTIVE BRANCH FAILS TO DO NECESSARY  
PAPERWORK AND THEREBY CAUSES REOPENING OF VERY ABRASIVE  
DISCUSSIONS OF FURTHER SUBSTANTIAL DELAYS, THERE WILL LIKELY BE  
VERY SERIOUS REACTION OVER TO SUBSTANTIAL DETRIMENT OF US INTERESTS  
IN ETHIOPIA.

~~SECRET~~





*Department of State*

# TELEGRAM

— ۱۴۴۳ —

100-443887-242

RECEIVED  
JAN 10 1967

U.S. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY  
WASHINGTON, D.C.

ATTENTION TO THIS IMPORTANT  
MATTER IS REQUESTED

1-10-67

~~SECRET~~

3


# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2 October 1975

*Memo For* COL C. Granger, NSC (Info - Mr. Mantel/OMB)  
(Transmittal No. 76-15)

Attached is a proposed Foreign Military Sales Case over \$25 Million. We plan to inform Congress after receiving concurrence.

Please report your concurrence or comments to Mr. Dan James at the Department of State (Telephone 632-3950).

  
LTC T. Martin  
DSAA/TC  
X697-8231



# OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

2 October 1975

**Memo For** Dan James, Dept of State PM/SAS

(Transmittal No. 76-15)

**Info:** Mr. W. Lewis

We plan to report information derived from the attached FMS Letter of Offer to Congress as Unclassified. However, there may be foreign policy implications in the release of this information in an unclassified form. The Letter of Offer is in process of negotiations between the USG and the purchasing nation involved, and consequently is subject to intra-governmental consideration by the purchasing nation. Should you determine this Letter of Offer should be classified, please advise us which item(s) of the transmittal (i.e., a, b, c, or d) are classified. Such will be bracketed on our report to Congress.



LTC T. Martin  
DSAA/TC  
X697-8231



OFFICE OF THE DIRECTOR DEFENSE SECURITY ASSISTANCE AGENCY  
AND  
DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (SECURITY ASSISTANCE), OASD/ISA  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

In reply refer to:  
I-10508/75

Honorable Carl Albert  
Speaker of the House  
of Representatives  
Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Speaker:

Pursuant to the reporting requirements of Section 36(b) of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended, we are forwarding herewith Transmittal No. 76-15, concerning the Department of the Air Force proposed Letter of Offer to Ethiopia for sixteen F-5E aircraft, repair parts, spare engines and contractor engineering technical services estimated to cost \$72.7 million. Shortly after this letter is delivered to your office, we plan to notify the news media.

Sincerely,



Transmittal No. 76-15  
Notice of Proposed Issuance of Letter of Offer  
Pursuant to Section 36(b)  
of the Foreign Military Sales Act, as amended

- a. Prospective Purchaser: Ethiopia
- b. Total Estimated Value: \$72.7 million
- c. Description of Articles or Services Offered: Sixteen F-5E aircraft, repair parts, spare engines and contractor engineering technical services.
- d. Military Department: Air Force
- e. Date Report Delivered to Congress:



NSC CORRESPONDENCE PROFILE

DOC		RECD		LOG NBR		INITIAL ACTION O	
MO	DA	MO	DA	HR	7506612		
1007		1008		12			

SOURCE/CLASS/DESCRIPTION	TO: PRES	FROM: <u>GRANGER</u> X	REFERENCE:	CIRCLE AS APPROPRIATE		
	KISSINGER	COLBY, W	S/S	UNCLAS	LOG IN/OUT	
	SCOWCROFT X	SCHLESINGER, J	OTHER	LOU	NO FORN	NO DIS
	DAVIS	ST EX SEC		C	EYES ONLY	EXDIS
				S	CODEWORD	
SUBJECT: <u>Artification to Congress of FMS Sale of \$25M to Ethiopia</u>						

DISTRIBUTION/INITIAL ACTION ASGMT	INTERNAL ROUTING AND DISTRIBUTION			REC CY FOR	ACTION REQUIRED
		ACTION	INFO		
	ADVANCE CYS TO HAK/SCOWCROFT				MEMO FOR HAK
	STAFF SECRETARY				MEMO FOR PRES
	FAR EAST				REPLY FOR
	SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA			X	APPROPRIATE ACTION
	MID EAST / NO. AFRICA / SO. ASIA				MEMO TO
	EUROPE / CANADA				RECOMMENDATIONS
	LATIN AMERICA				JOINT MEMO
	UNITED NATIONS				REFER TO FOR
	ECONOMIC				ANY ACTION NECESSARY
	SCIENTIFIC				CONCURRENCE
	PROGRAM ANALYSIS				DUE DATE
	NSC PLANNING				COMMENTS: (INCLUDING SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS)
	CONGRESSIONAL			X	
OCEANS POLICY					
INTELLIGENCE					

SUBSEQUENT ROUTING/ACTIONS	DATE	FROM	NO	S	SUBSEQUENT ACTION REQUIRED (OR TAKEN):	CY TO
	10/08	Granger	10/15	X	Decision	Done (HORON JANKA)
	10/19	NSC/S	5		Granger further action	(10-14)
	10/22	Scowcroft	X		Decision	(11/01) Done (Horon Janka)
	10/23	NSC/S	-		Scowcroft signed approved recommendation	
	10/23	Granger	S		Any further action	(10/24)
	10/24	Granger	NSC/S	C	State Notified of NSC's concurrence of 76-15 (Ethiopia)	

NSC/S DISP INSTR	DISPATCH	MICROFILM & FILE RQMTS:	
	CY RQMTS: SEE ABOVE PLUS:	MAILED NOV 2 1975 BY	
	NOTIFY & DATE BY	CRT ID:	SA SF
	SPECIAL DISPOSITION:	OPEN	HP NS
	CROSS REF W/	CLOSE	WH EP
SUSPENSE CY ATTACHED: X	FOLDER:	PA	DY



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

AF/E:RSBARRETT-L/HR:CRUNYON:NB

9/17/76 X 20852

AF:TSEELYE

AF:DBOLEN

NSC:AMB. SMITH

P - MR. HABIB

D/HA:RPALMER

AF/I:JWHITING {INFO}

S/S

ROUTINE

ADDIS ABABA

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: SHUM, PINS

SUBJECT: APPROACH TO PMG ON POLITICAL DETAINEES

1. IN VIEW OF RECENT HIGH LEVEL INTEREST IN ETHIOPIAN HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION (ANTHONY EDEN LETTER TO PRESIDENT, CLARK SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS) WE BELIEVE TIME IS NOW APPROPRIATE TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT ONCE AGAIN WITH PMG. ACCORDINGLY YOU SHOULD TAKE NEXT OPPORTUNITY TO EXPRESS USC'S CONCERNS TO PMG. WE LEAVE LEVEL AND MANNER OF APPROACH TO YOUR JUDGMENT.

2. YOUR APPROACH SHOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING POINTS: FACT WE HAVE PREVIOUSLY DISCUSSED THIS ISSUE WITH PMG; OUR GRATIFICATION AT THE RECENT RELEASE OF SOME PRISONERS; OUR HOPE THAT IT WILL SOON BE POSSIBLE FOR THE PMG TO EFFECT FURTHER RELEASES, ESPECIALLY OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN; OUR CONCERN OVER REPORTS THAT SOME OF THE WOMEN AND CHILDREN ARE SHOWING SIGNS OF PHYSICAL AND MENTAL SUFFERING AS A RESULT OF THEIR IMPRISONMENT; OUR BELIEF THAT ALL PRISONERS HAVE THE RIGHT TO BE RELEASED OR PROMPTLY AND FAIRLY TRIED AND IN ANY EVENT TO BE TREATED HUMANELY.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ HR 10/18/01

3. ~~YOU MAY IN YOUR DISCRETION ALSO REFER TO INCREASING~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

1 2

3. YOU MAY IN YOUR DISCRETION ALSO REFER TO INCREASING CONCERN EXPRESSED TO USG OVER HUMAN RIGHTS SITUATION IN ETHIOPIA AND THE CRITICISM OF USG FOR CONTINUING TO SUPPLY MILITARY EQUIPMENT TO PNG IN VIEW OF REPORTS OF HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS. THIS IS REFLECTED IN RECENT US LEGISLATION REQUIRING THAT WE PAY CLOSE HEED TO HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH ECONOMIC AND SECURITY ASSISTANCE. YY

01